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Abstract
This paper explores the determinants of airfares paid by hub -and- spoke
passengers, focusing in particular on the effects of traffic densities on the
network spokes along which they travel. Using both structural and reduced- form
approaches, we find that high spoke densities lead to low fares, confirming the
existence of the economies of traffic density first identified by Caves,
Chris tensen and Tretheway (1984) while showing that the resulting cost savings
are passed on in part to consumers. We also report estimates of the airlines'
marginal cost and demand functions using a structural approach. Our results
reveal economies of density stronger than those found by Caves et al . Finally,
we use the structural estimates to simulate the welfare effects of airline
mergers
.
*For their support of this research, we wish to thank the National Science
Foundation (grant #SES-9023353) , the Transportation Systems Center of the U.S.
Department of Transportation, and both the Institute of Government and Public
Affairs and the Research Board at the University of Illinois. We also thank
George Bittlingmayer , Shane Greens tein, Wally Hendricks, Roger Koenker, and
Charles Kolstad for comments (errors, of course, are ours). Finally, we
acknowledge the able research assistance of Nichola Dyer.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/faresnetworkfeed91180brue
Fares and Network 'Feed' : Estimating Economies of Traffic Density in Airline
Hub -and-Spoke Systems
by
Jan K. Brueckner and Pablo T. Spiller
1. Introduction
Airline deregulation has led to fundamental changes in both firm
organization and industry structure. At the firm level, the elimination of
restrictions on entry and exit dramatically altered the way airlines conduct
their operations. Granted the freedom to fly wherever they wish, the carriers
responded by transforming their route structures into hub-and-spoke networks,
where passengers change planes at a hub airport on the way to their eventual
destinations. 1 By feeding all passengers through a hub, such a network
generates high traffic densities on its spoke routes. This allows the airline
to exploit economies of traffic density, under which cost per passenger on a
non-stop route decreases as traffic on the route rises. 2 Network "feed" (the
flow of passengers through the hub) thus generates efficiency gains, reducing
the cost of providing airline service.
In addition to stimulating the growth of hub-and-spoke networks,
^or discussion of the impact of the new regulatory environment on airline
operations, see Bailey and Williams (1988), Bailey, Graham and Kaplan
(1985), Levine (1988), Moore (1986), and Morrison and Winston (1986). A
measure of the increase in "hubbing" is provided by McShan and Windle
(1990) , who show that the total enplanements of each carrier became
increasingly concentrated at selected airports over the 1980 's (Bailey et
al. (1985) provide similar data for departures)
.
2Economies of density arise because high density allows the airline to use
larger, more efficient aircraft and to operate these aircraft more
intensively (at higher load factors) . See Bailey et al . (1985) , especially
Tables 3.4 and 3.5. In addition, higher densities allow more intensive use
of fixed ground facilities as well as more effective aircraft utilization
(more flight hours per day)
.
deregulation has also led to structural changes in the industry. Most
importantly, the industry has become more concentrated at the national level,
raising concerns about the exercise of market power by the large airlines. 3 In
addition, concentration has increased locally at certain hub airports, which
are now dominated by a single carrier. This development has raised concerns
about the exercise of market power over local traffic at the dominated hubs. 4
In contrast, competitive conditions in the average city-pair market have
improved over the period of deregulation. As shown by Morrison and Winston
(1991) , the number of competing airlines per market has increased over the
period despite the growing concentration of the industry. 5
These changes in industry structure are in part a consequence of the
changing organization of firms, as reflected in the growth of hub -and- spoke
networks. First, given that such networks allow carriers to exploit economies
of density, firms with large, dense networks enjoy low costs per passenger,
which yields a competitive advantage. Therefore, the development of hub-and-
spoke networks may help explain the demise of smaller carriers and the
3Morrison and Winston (1991) show how the number of effective competitors in
the industry, which equals the inverse of the Herfindahl index, has changed
since deregulation. This number was around 9.5 in 1978, rose to over 11.5
by early 1985, and then fell to around 8 . by 1989 following a number of
mergers and bankruptcies. Other changes in industry structure are also
thought to inhibit competition, namely the use of computerized reservation
systems and the existence of marketing arrangements with travel agents.
4By 1988, single carriers controlled 60% or more of the traffic at the
following major airports: Atlanta, Charlotte, Cincinnati, Detroit,
Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Raleigh -Durham, St. Louis, and Salt Lake City.
Borenstein (1989) provides empirical evidence regarding the effect of hub
dominance on fares
.
5In 1978, the average number of effective competitors per market (the average
across markets of the inverse of the market Herfindahl index) was slightly
above 1.5. This number had grown to a value slightly below 1 . 9 by the end
of 1989 (see Morrison and Winston (1991).
difficulty of entry by new firms (and thus the increase in industry
concentration) . Second, since the operation of a hub-and-spoke network
requires heavy use of a hub airport, such an airport tends to become dominated
by the network airline. Thus, acquisition of local market power in the hub
city is often concomitant to the development of a network. Finally, the
increase in competition in the average market may be due to an additional
effect of hub-and-spoke operations: the lowering of entry costs into individual
city-pair markets. Airlines can now enter a host of new markets by simply
adding a new city to the network (service can then be provided between that
endpoint and any other city served from the hub)
.
Given the efficiency gains from network operations, and the associated
growth in competitors per market, the hub-and-spoke system appears to offer
substantial benefits that may offset the system's unfavorable effects on
industry concentration and on the welfare of hub -city passengers. However,
because hub-and-spoke networks have received little attention by researchers,
the magnitude of such benefits is unknown. The purpose of the present paper is
to explore one aspect of hub-and-spoke benefits by attempting to quantify the
efficiency gains from network operations. The paper tests for the presence of
economies of traffic density and attempts to measure the strength of the
density effect.
Some progress toward these goals has already been achieved by Caves,
Christensen and Tretheway (1984), who estimate the extent of economies of
density by analyzing the relationship between airline total costs, route
structure, and total passenger traffic. They find that, holding the airline's
route structure (the number of points served) constant, total cost increases
only 80% as rapidly as total traffic, indicating significant economies of
density. While this is an important finding, there has been no parallel study
of the connection between the fares that airlines actually charge and the
traffic densities on their routes. We explore the density effect using this
alternative method. Relying on detailed Department of Transportation data, we
study airline fares for city-pair markets in which travel requires a connection
at a hub airport. We find that the fare paid by a connecting passenger is low
when the traffic densities on the two network spokes along which he travels are
high . This effect holds constant other variables (such as competition and
tourism potential) that affect fares in the city-pair market. Our finding of
an inverse relation between fares and spoke traffic confirms the existence of
the economies of density identified by Caves et_al. (1984) and shows that the
gains are in part passed on to passengers. This is an important finding
because it shows that hub-and- spoke operations have indeed benefitted
consumers
.
Although these reduced- form regression results show that consumers pay
relatively low fares when travelling on dense spokes, they do not reveal the
extent of the cost savings from higher density (nor what fraction of these
savings are passed on to consumers) . To directly estimate the strength of
economies of density, we develop a structural model of competition among hub-
and-spoke airlines. Estimation of such a model requires assumptions about the
nature of the oligopoly game played by the airlines as well as the functional
forms of demand and marginal cost. Estimated economies of density in the
structural model turn out to be stronger than those reported by Caves et al .
(1984). The procedure also generates plausible demand elasticities.
As a final exercise, we use the above structural estimates to investigate
an important public policy question: the welfare effect of hypothetical airline
mergers. There has been considerable concern about the welfare effects of
mergers which, like those of TWA-Ozark and Northwest-Republic, lead to the
creation of a monopoly hub airport. As explained above, the post-merger
airline's monopoly power over hub -originating and hub- terminating passengers is
expected to raise fares substantially for those passengers. We have argued
elsewhere, however, that connecting passengers, who are not subject to monopoly
power, may actually benefit from the merger as a result of the creation of a
larger, more densely- travelled network (see below). Using the structural
estimates, we address these issues by simulating the effects on fares and
overall welfare of a TWA-Ozark -type merger. The forces at work are familiar
from standard oligopoly models: a merger under increasing returns leads to
lower costs while at the same time reducing competition. The welfare outcome
depends on the relative strength of these two effects. Our simulations suggest
that the balance tips in one direction in the case of a TWA- Ozark- type merger
while showing how fare impacts vary between connecting passengers and those
travelling to or from the hub (the simulations also show the merger's spillover
effects on competing networks)
.
The present paper builds on the approach of an earlier paper (Brueckner,
Dyer and Spiller (1990); hereafter BDS) , which offered indirect evidence on the
connection between economies of density and fares. Rather than relating fares
directly to spoke traffic levels, BDS explored the relation between fares and
network characteristics, proceeding on the assumption that traffic within a
network is ultimately a function of its characteristics. For example, BDS
hypothesized that spoke traffic in a network is an increasing function of the
size of the network, as measured by the number of city pairs that it connects
(a large network offers many destinations, and thus generates high traffic
levels on each of its spokes). This effect, together with economies of
density, implies that fares for connecting passengers should be inversely
related to the size of the network in which a trip occurs. BDS ' s regressions
showed that network characteristics are indeed important determinants of fares.
In this paper, we perform a more stringent test of BDS ' s basic hypothesis by
studying the link between fares, marginal costs, and actual spoke traffic
levels
.
Our paper follows BDS in extending a recent literature that studies the
determination of fares in airline city-pair markets. This literature, which
contains notable contributions by Bailey, Graham and Kaplan (1985), Berry
(1990), Borenstein (1989), Call and Keeler (1985), Graham, Kaplan and Sibley
(1983), Hurdle et al . (1989), and Morrison and Winston (1989, 1990), explores
the connection between airfares and market-specific variables. These include
measures of demand (city populations and incomes) , cost (flight distance and
load factors), and competition (number of competitors, market share). BDS
criticized this literature for its failure to include network characteristics
in its fare regressions. The present study, which goes beyond the reduced- form
approach of BDS, makes this point even more clearly: Given that marginal costs
and fares in a city-pair market are shown to depend critically on traffic
levels along the spokes connecting the market cities, and given that these
spokes carry traffic in a multitude of other city-pair markets, fares in the
given market depend on the operation of the entire network. Therefore, network
considerations must be included not only in any fare regression but in any
structural analysis of the airline industry. 6
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of
our methodology, while section 3 presents the results of the reduced- form fare
regression. Section 4 presents the structural estimates, and Section 5 carries
out the merger simulations. Section 6 offers conclusions.
6Using an approach similar to ours, Hurdle et al . (1989) include a measure of
traffic density on the route segment serving a city-pair market (which
includes passengers travelling beyond the endpoints of the market) in a
regression explaining fares. However, under their specification, this
variable (which plays a minor role in the study) has no significant impact
on fares
.
2 . Overview of Methodology
Data for the study are drawn from Databank 1A (DBlA) of the Department of
Transportation's Origin and Destination Survey . This databank shows fare and
route information for a quarterly 10% sample of all airline tickets sold in the
U.S. Each record of the databank contains an airline itinerary (a route flown
on a given carrier, with the direction of travel indicated), a dollar fare, the
distance of the trip, and the number of passengers flown on the itinerary at
the given fare during the quarter. The sample period is the fourth quarter of
1985.
As explained above, our task is to see whether economies of density are
revealed in the DBlA fare data. We explore the density effect by focusing on
4-segment city-pair markets, where passengers change planes at a hub airport
during their trip (the round trip thus involves 4 flight segments) . 2 -segment
(i.e., nonstop) markets are not considered on the grounds that they are less
likely to reveal a density effect. This is true because the endpoints of many
2
-segment markets are hub airports dominated by a single carrier, whose market
power raises fares above costs, obscuring any density effect (see Borenstein
(1989)). In addition, most 2-segment travel occurs on dense route segments
between large cities, where economies of density may be exhausted. By
contrast, 4-segment passengers are likely to travel on at least one low-density
network spoke (serving a small or medium-size endpoint) , where economies of
density are unexhausted (and thus observable) . To illustrate the extent of 4-
segment travel through hub airports, the appendix shows the number of 4-segment
city-pair markets served by the major hub -and- spoke networks in the sample,
along with other relevant network characteristics (these are computed from the
DBlA data)
.
7
7In compiling the data set, attention is restricted 4-segment single-carrier
round trips where the connecting (hub) airport is the same in both
directions. Records whose itineraries show travel outside the U.S. are
8Fares in a 4 -segment market will depend, in part, on the carrier's
marginal cost of serving an additional passenger in the market. Marginal cost
in turn depends on flight distance and on carrier characteristics such as labor
cost. With economies of traffic density, another factor exerts an important
influence on marginal cost: total traffic levels on the two network spokes used
by passengers in the market.
To understand the role of spoke traffic, consider the simple network
shown in Figure 1, which connects three endpoints out of hub A and thus serves
three 4-segment markets: ij , ik, and jk. Let c(Q) denote the cost of operating
a single spoke of the network as a function of traffic on that spoke. The
marginal cost of serving a passenger in market ij is then equal to c'(Qi) +
c ' (Qs ) , where Q^ and Qj are total traffic levels on spokes i and j. Since
economies of density imply c" < 0, marginal cost is decreasing in Q i and Qj
.
Moreover, if the marginal cost function is linear in Q, then c' (Q i ) + c'(Qj) is
simply a function of Q i + Qj , total traffic on the spokes connecting the market
cities. 8 Thus, in the linear case, a passenger's marginal cost in market ij
depends on Q i + Qj , flight distance, and carrier- specific fixed effects (which
excluded, as are itineraries where one or both endpoints did not appear on a
chosen list of 267 cities. In addition, in computing the network
characteristics shown in the appendix, we restrict attention to DB1A records
with passenger levels of 2 or greater (corresponding to quarterly traffic of
20). There are 23,428 4-segment itineraries satisfying these requirements,
involving travel in 8179 distinct nondirectional city-pair markets (the
difference arises because itineraries are directional and because multiple
carriers and multiple same-carrier routes serve a given market). As pointed
out by BDS , the volume of 4-segment traffic in the sample period was about
one -half the volume of 2 -segment traffic. It should be noted that the fare
regressions reported below are based on subset of the data used to generate
network characteristics (only those DBlA records with 4 or more passengers
are used in order to exclude extremely thin markets)
.
8It is important to note that since passengers in other markets travel along
spokes i and j, Q i + Qj (and thus marginal cost in market ij ) depends on the
operation of the entire network (along with ij traffic, Q i includes traffic
in market ik and traffic between i and the hub, and similarly for Qj).
represent labor costs and other determinants of operating costs) . Note that
since a decline in marginal cost tends to reduce fares, fares should be
inversely related to Q i + Q, with economies of density. Summary data on spoke
traffic is provided in the appendix, which shows average spoke traffic levels
for the major hub -and- spoke networks. 9
Two additional forces help determine fares in a city-pair market: demand
and the level of competition. Competition is measured by simply counting the
number of market competitors. Demand is assumed to depend on the size of the
market (a function of the populations of the endpoint cities) , on income in the
market, and on the market's tourism potential. These factors, along with the
variables underlying marginal cost, determine equilibrium fares in the market.
Fares thus depend on spoke traffic; distance; carrier fixed- effects ; market
size, income, and tourism potential; the level of competition.
One approach to testing for economies of density is simply to regress
fares on this list of variables, estimating a reduced- form equation. 10 The
coefficient of spoke traffic in this regression should be negative in the
presence of economies of density. While this approach shows the equilibrium
response of fares to changes in the market variables, it does not reveal the
9Spoke traffic data comes from the DOT's Service Segment Databank DB27R, which
shows a carrier's total monthly traffic on each nonstop route segment that
it serves (traffic is aggregated across individual flights). These traffic
levels, as well as those used in the regressions, are found by summing
traffic in both directions on the spoke and dividing by two (this is done
for the 4th quarter of 1985)
.
10While most of the explanatory variables in this regression are unambiguously
exogenous, the status of the spoke traffic and competition variables
requires discussion. Below, we argue that since each city-pair market
contributes negligibly to total spoke traffic, this variable is properly
viewed as exogenous. The same conclusion need not apply to the level of
competition, which may be determined jointly with fares. However, we
explain below that a proper simultaneity correction is difficult to carry
out. Our regression thus contains a potentially endogenous variable, which
means that the equation is probably best view as a "quasi reduced- form.
"
10
underlying- structure of marginal cost and demand. In particular, the approach
does not reveal the strength of economies of density (the coefficient of spoke
traffic in the marginal cost function). To estimate the structural parameters,
additional assumptions must be made regarding functional forms and the nature
of competitive interactions. The resulting structural model can then be
estimated, recovering the parameters of interest.
Both these approaches are carried out below. In Section 3, we report the
results of estimating a reduced- form equation. For comparability with our
earlier work, the specification of this equation is identical to that in BDS
,
except that spoke traffic is used in place of network characterisitics . The
regression results confirm the presence of economies of density, justifying a
more ambitious attempt to estimate structural parameters. The structural
model, which is developed in Section 4, assumes linear demand and marginal cost
as well as Cournot behavior on the part of the airlines. Estimation makes use
of the model's two reduced- form equations (one for the fare, one for traffic in
the market) . These equations are estimated jointly by maximum likelihood
taking cross -equation restrictions into account. In the structural model, the
carrier-specific fare data are aggregated up to the market level (an average
market fare is used). By contrast, each observation under the reduced- form
approach corresponds to a fare charged by a particular carrier.
3. Reduced-Form Estimation
We begin by identifying the specific variables used in the reduced- form
regression. Many of these variables appear later in the structural model.
a. Explanatory variables
First, as explained above, the spoke traffic variable is equal to the sum
of the traffic levels on the two spokes connecting the endpoints of the city-
pair market to the carrier's hub (traffic is for the fourth quarter of 1985).
11
This variable, denoted SPKPASS , is thus equal to SPKPASSO + SPKPASSD, where
SPKPASSO is traffic on the spoke connecting the market's origin city to the hub
and SPKPASSD is traffic on the spoke connecting the market's destination city
to the hub (variable definitions are found in Table 1) . Recall that when the
spoke marginal cost function is linear, the marginal cost of serving a
passenger in the market depends on the sum of SPKPASSO and SPKPASSD.
Variables used along with spoke traffic to capture carrier costs are
DIST, one-way flight distance on the route; a set of carrier dummy variables
(American is the default carrier) ; and dummy variables that assume the value 1
if one endpoint of the market is a particular slot-controlled airport (slot
control raises the cost of providing airline service at the airport) . These
dummies are denoted ORD (Chicago-O'Hare) , LGA (La Guardia) , DCA (Washington-
National), and JFK (John F. Kennedy).
Three variables measure the demand for travel in a city-pair market. The
first is MKTPP (market population potential) and is equal to (POP^OPj) 1 / 2 for
market ij , where POP is city population measured in 10,000s. 11 This variable is
a measure of the size of the market. The second demand variable is INCORIG
,
which equals per capita income for the origin city. Use of origin income,
rather than a composite measure of income at both market endpoints, reflects
our expectation that although published fares are nondirectional , observed
fares will depend on the direction of travel in a market. High income at the
origin city is likely to result in reduced sensitivity to the cost of travel by
origin residents and thus greater willingness to purchase less restrictive (and
thus more expensive) directional tickets. Another directional demand variable
is TEMPDIF, equal to the destination's mean January temperature minus the
origin's mean January temperature. A high value of TEMPDIF, which indicates
^This variable is also used by Graham, Kaplan and Sibley (1984) and Call and
Keeler (1985).
12
that origin residents are likely to engage in vacation travel in the market, is
expected to lead to lower observed fares as these passengers select the most
restrictive (and hence cheapest) tickets. 12
Competition is measured by computing the total number of carriers
competing with the observed carrier in the market, denoted MKTCOM (competition
could be via 4-segment or nonstop service). 13 While MKTCOM can be used
directly, we let the effect of extra competition depend on the initial number
of competitors by constructing the variables MKTC0M1 , MKTCOM23, and MKTC0M4+
(this follows BDS) . MKTC0M1 ' s coefficient gives the effect on fares of
increasing MKTCOM from to 1 ; MKTCOM23's coefficient gives the effect of
increasing MKTCOM from 1 to 2 or from 2 to 3 ; MKTC0M4+'s coefficient gives the
effect of increasing MKTCOM from 3 to 4 and beyond. 14 These coefficients are
12As argued by BDS, observed fares may also differ by direction as a result of
yield manangement by the carriers. Residents of a high- income origin city
may find few cheap seats on the most convenient flights (e.g., morning
departures) to some low- income destination. Cheap seats may be abundant,
however, on convenient departures from the low- income city to the high-
income destination. Through yield management, the carrier can therefore
price discriminate within a given market on the basis of city income despite
the fact that published fares are nondirectional.
13A carrier was counted as a competitor if it was observed carrying 2 or more
passengers in either direction in the market. Also, if the same competing
carrier served the market via two different routes (i.e., nonstop and
connecting) , it was counted as two competitors (by offering passengers more
choice, multiple routings yield more effective competition than a single
route) . The potential endogeneity of MKTCOM is discussed below.
14These variables, which are adapted from Morrison and Winston (1989), are
defined as follows:
MKTC0M1 = «
MKTCOM if MKTCOM - 0,1
1 otherwise
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expected to be negative and declining in absolute value, indicating diminishing
returns to competition. To measure potential competition in the market, we use
the variable MKTPCOM, which is equal to the number of carriers that serve both
endpoints of the market but do not provide service in the market itself. 15
b. Results
We ran fare regressions on the subset of 4- segment DB1A records showing 4
or more passengers during the quarter (for a predicted total of 40). 16 Results
were computed for two different samples drawn from this data set. The first
sample treats multiple fares charged by a carrier on a given route as distinct
observations, using all records in the data set (this yields 13,308
observations) . An alternative approach is to aggregate multiple fares into a
single value for each carrier on a route. This is done by taking a simple
average of a carrier's multiple fares, a procedure that yields 7732
observations (this shows that, on average, there are slightly fewer than 2
observed fares per carrier on each route). 17 These two samples are referred to
MKTCOM23 = «
' if MKTCOM =0,1
MKTCOM- 1 if MKTCOM =2,3
2 otherwise
MKTC0M4+ = «
if MKTCOM = 0,1,2,3
MKTCOM- 3 otherwise
15This approach again follows Morrison and Winston (1989).
16Recall that the data comes from a 10% sample of tickets. Following the
approach of BDS , records whose network showed a NTWCITP4 value of less than
10 were dropped (see the appendix) , as were records where the origin or
destination was a hub for the carrier (one spoke of such an itinerary
connects two of the carrier's hubs). Records with a fare of less than $10
were also dropped.
17Computing the passenger-weighted mean fare, as done by BDS, leads to nearly-
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below as the "individual -fare" and "mean- fare" samples. Finally, as in BDS
,
the dependent variable for the regression is the log of the round- trip fare (as
explained further below, results are not sensitive to the functional form of
the equation)
.
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients from the reduced- form fare
regressions (the individual -fare results are in the first column and the mean-
fare results are in the second column) . Estimated coefficients of the carrier
and slot-control dummies from the mean-fare regression are reported in Table 3.
The coefficient of SPKPASS is significantly negative in the equations of Table
2, showing that fares in a city-pair market are low when traffic on the spokes
connecting the cities is high. This finding confirms the existence of
economies of traffic density and shows that the resulting cost savings are
partly passed on to consumers in the form of lower fares. The result,
moreover, has public-policy significance because it identifies a potential
source of the benefits of deregulation (exploitation of economies of density
via hub -and- spoke networks)
.
For a concrete illustration of our result, consider the city-pair market
Champaign, Illinois-Cleveland (CMI-CLE) , served by United through its Chicago-
O'Hare (ORD) hub. Our result says that United 's fares in the CMI-CLE market
will be lower the higher are the traffic levels on the CMI-ORD and CLE -ORD
spokes of its network. The spokes in question, of course, carry United traffic
in a multitude of other city-pair markets (the CMI-ORD spoke carries traffic in
all markets with CMI as an endpoint, while the CLE-ORD spoke carries traffic in
all markets with CLE as an endpoint). United's CMI-CLE fares thus depend on
traffic levels in many other markets and, therefore, on the operation of its
entire network.
Turning to the other estimated coefficients, the low t-statistics for
identical results.
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MKTPP and INCORIG suggest that market size and income have no impact on fares
when spoke traffic and competition are held constant. 18 A tourism effect,
however, does emerge strongly in the results, with TEMPDIF's significantly-
negative coefficients indicating that observed fares are lower in vacation
markets as passengers select the most restrictive tickets. Finally, the
results indicate that fares are increasing in distance flown.
The estimates also show diminishing returns to competition, with the
coefficients of MKTC0M1, MKTCOM23, and MKTC0M4+ significantly negative and
declining in absolute value in each equation. The significantly negative
coefficients of MKTPCOM also show that potential competition reduces fares. It
is worth noting that correlation between MKTPCOM and SPKPASS reduces both size
and significance of SPKPASS 's coefficient. The third column of Table 2 shows
that when MKTPCOM is deleted from the mean- fare equation, SPKPASS 's coefficient
increases by 60% in absolute value. 19 - 20
Recalling the dependent variable is the log of the fare, the impacts in
percentage terms of changes in the right hand variables follow immediately.
Using coefficients from column 2 of Table 2, a one -standard- deviation increase
18While the absence of an income effect contradicts expectations, INCORIG does
have a significantly positive coefficient when the regression is run on the
subsample of observations where the fare class is coach discount (YD) for
all segments of the trip (see footnote 24). MKTPP's coefficient is
significantly negative in that regression.
19Note that the coefficient of MKTPP is significantly negative in the third
equation. Correlation between MKTPCOM and MKTPP also reduces the
explanatory power of the latter variable.
20It should be noted that there are a number of inexplicably "thin" spokes in
the data. For example, in the mean- fare sample, there are 125 observations
where either SPKPASSO or SPKPASSD is less than 500, a number that
corresponds to spoke traffic of around 5 passengers per day. However,
deleting these observations from the sample has little effect on the
results. The SPKPASS coefficient is then -0.000000345, a value almost
identical to the estimate in the second column of Table 2.
16
in SPKPASS above its mean value of 65,345 (an increase of 32,924) leads to a
reduction in the city-pair market's mean fare of 1.2%. 21 Using the second mean-
fare equation (column 3), the same increase in SPKPASS leads to a larger 1.9%
fare decrease. While these effects seem modest, results based on a structural
model yield larger fare impacts, as will be seen below. From column 2, a 10%
increase in distance leads to a 2.6% fare increase, while a one -standard-
deviation increase in TEMPDIF (equal to 21.3) above its mean value of 3.5 leads
to a 2.3% fare reduction. If the number of competitors in the market (MKTCOM)
increases from zero to one, fares fall by 7.1%. If MKTCOM increases from one
to two or from two to three, fares fall by a further 5.9%; further unit
increases in MKTCOM reduce fares by 0.4%. If the number of potential
competitors (MKTPCOM) increases by one, fares fall by 1.9%. 22
The estimated coefficients of the slot-control and airline dummies from
the mean-fare regression are reported in Table 3. Only the ORD and DCA dummy
coefficients are significant with the anticipated positive sign. The carrier
dummy coefficients show substantial fare differences across carriers (recall
that American is the default carrier) . Especially noteworthy are the 24%
21These statistics are from the mean-fare sample. Note that traffic on a spoke
used by a passenger in an average market is half of the above figure, or
about 32,500. This number is much higher than the average spoke traffic
from Table A-l in the appendix, which is computed by averaging across
network spokes rather than across markets. This discrepancy attests to the
fact that any sampling procedure will pick up disproportionate numbers of
passengers from "thick" spokes.
22Further mean- fare sample information is as follows. The mean value of MKTCOM
is 3.2, and the relative frequencies of observations with MKTCOM equal to 0,
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 or more are 21.9%, 17.8%, 15.2%, 10.6%, 8.8%, 6.3%, and
19.3% respectively. The mean value of MKTPCOM is 2.4, and the relative
frequencies of observations with MKTPCOM equal to 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 or
more are 13.3%, 21.3%, 23.2%, 19.4%, 12.1%, and 11.7% respectively. The
mean values of MKTPP and INCORIG are 160.8 and $10,078 respectively.
Finally, the mean fare is $294 and the average number of passengers per
observation is 12, corresponding to quarterly traffic of 120.
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premium charged by Delta and the 22% and 52% discounts offered by America West
and Air Cal respectively.
The above regressions have been viewed as reduced- form equations, in
which all right hand variables are exogenous. This assumption requires
justification in the cases of SPKPASS and MKTCOM. Given that SPKPASS is the
sum of (endogenous) traffic levels in all city-pair markets that use the given
spokes, it might appear that this variable should be treated as endogenous.
However, becauses SPKPASS is largely determined by traffic levels in other
markets, it can be treated as exogenous relative to the fare in any given
market (this claim will be explained more fully in the next section) . As for
MKTCOM, it can be argued that the level of competition in a city-pair market is
jointly determined along with the fares charged in the market. However, proper
handling of this simultaneity requires a structural model of entry within
airline networks, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 23 While the
simultaneity issue can be addressed in the usual way via two- stage least
squares (see BDS) , we chose not to pursue this approach in the present paper,
relying instead on OLS methods.
As explained above, BDS estimate a fare equation where network
characteristics appear as proxies for spoke traffic. Aside from this
difference, the specification of BDS ' s equation is identical to that in Table
2. 24 BDS hypothesize, for example, that spoke traffic is an increasing function
23For analysis of entry, see Berry (1989) and Reiss and Spiller (1989). The
entry issue, however, may be different in a network context from the one
analyzed by these authors. The reason is that entry in a particular city-
pair market by a network airline entails simultaneous entry in many other
markets (providing new service in a market means adding a spoke to the
carrier's network, which in turn allows service to a host of additional
markets)
. Since the presence of competition in a city-pair market will thus
depend partly on network factors, a simple model positing joint
determination of fares and competition in each individual market will be
inaccurate.
18
of network size, and thus anticipate a negative size coefficient in the fare
equation. BDS's results confirm this expectation and show that other density-
related network characteristics have anticipated impacts on fares. Although
BDS plausibly argue that their results are due to a density effect, this claim
is not actually tested because no direct evidence on the link between network
characteristics and spoke traffic is provided. Using the spoke traffic data,
this link in BDS's argument can now be verified. This exercise is carried out
in the appendix, which reports the results of a regression of SPKPASS on
network characteristics. This regression shows that BDS's network variables do
serve as proxies for spoke traffic in the manner hypothesized. For example,
the results show that SPKPASS is an increasing function of network size, as
measured by the number of 4- segment markets served. Given these results, BDS's
findings are properly viewed as indirect evidence of the existence of economies
of density.
4. Structural Estimation
We saw in the last section that fares at the city-pair level are
inversely related to spoke traffic densities. Moreover, the appendix shows
that spoke traffic is itself a function of network characteristics. These
results strongly suggest that network operations have an important impact, via
the density effect, on the cost of providing airline service. However, since
the fraction of the cost savings passed on to passengers is unobserved, the
strength of the density effect is unknown. Are most of the benefits passed on,
so that economies of density are approximated by the observed fare effect? Or
are much of the gains retained by the airlines, in which case the fare effect
24BDS's main results are based on observations from the individual -fare sample
where the fare class is YD (coach-discount) for all segments of the trip.
Unreported estimates of the present model using that sample are similar to
those in Table 2 (the sample has 9790 observations)
.
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understates the strength of economies of density? The purpose of this section
is to begin the task of answering these questions.
Unfortunately, information that would allow us to directly estimate a
cost function at the spoke level is not available (accounting data, which is
organized at the firm level, provides no information relevant to individual
spokes or markets). As a result, estimation of the desired cost function must
be based on a structural model of airline behavior. There are three components
to a structural model of any industry: demand, cost, and the nature of
oligopolistic interaction. As explained below, assumptions must be made in
each of these areas to carry out the estimation. It should be clear that our
results will be sensitive, at least to some extent, to the nature of these
assumptions
.
a. The structural model
Initially, we ignore demand heterogeneity across different groups of
travellers (businessmen, vacationers, etc.), and assume that market demand is
represented by a single demand function. 25 We also assume linearity, so that
the inverse demand function for travel in market m is given by26
Pm = am + d/b)qm + c m.
(1)
25Reiss and Spiller (1989) estimate a model of airline demand which takes into
account substitution between connecting and direct (nonstop) travel.
Developing the present analysis along these lines would add substantial
complications, as competition among differentiated products would have to be
modelled. Reiss and Spiller 's (1989) main focus, however, was on demand,
while our emphasis is on costs. For that reason, we leave the elaboration
of the demand side of our analysis for future research.
26To simplify terminology, we refer to directional routes as "markets" in the
rest of the paper. A given nondirectional city-pair market, say ij , thus
contains two "markets" under this definition: the market for travel from i
to j and back, and the market for travel from j to i and back. The term
"city-pair market," however, will continue to be used in a nondirectional
sense
.
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where pm is the fare, qm is the number of round- trip passengers in the market,
and em is a normally distributed error term with mean zero and constant variance
<7 e
2
. Note that the demand intercept a,,, is market- specific (depending on income,
tourism potential, etc.) while the (negative) slope 1/b is the same for all
markets. As noted above, this formulation ignores the multiplicity of fares in
a given market, which arises mainly because of price discrimination between
business and vacation travellers. However, it will be seen below that (1) can
be viewed as the aggregate demand function across such groups, with pm
representing the average fare in the market.
Regarding airline behavior, we assume that the carriers behave as if they
play a Nash game in quantities. Since our data is a single-period cross
-
section of markets and firms, models of dynamic games cannot be estimated.
Moreover, alternative one -period behavioral models such as marginal cost
pricing or perfect collusion are not very compelling for the airline industry. 27
In any case, both Reiss and Spiller (1989) and Brander and Zhang (1990) find
that the Cournot solution concept cannot be rejected in favor of models using
more general conjectural variations. Imposing the Cournot assumption and
letting q im denote carrier i's traffic in market m, with S^q^m = qm , the
carrier's marginal revenue in market m can be written as
MRin, = am + (l/b)(qm + q im ) + *m .
(2)
Carrier i's total cost function for operating the J spokes of its network
is given by
27Marginal cost pricing is inconsistent with declining marginal costs, while
monopoly pricing is inconsistent with previous empirical studies and casual
empiricism on competitiveness in the industry.
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c il(Qil) + c i2(Qi2) + ... + Cij(Qij) + Fif
(3)
where Q^ is traffic on the j th spoke and F i represents fixed costs, and where
the spoke cost functions Cy(-) satisfy c^" < with economies of density. If
market m includes cities k and r, then using (3), the marginal cost of serving
a passenger in the market is c ik '(Q ik ) + c ir '(Q ir ). When the spoke marginal cost
function has the form c^' - 7^ + >3Q rf i j , this expression becomes 7 ik + 7 ir +
^(Q*ik + Q^ir) • Consider the special case where marginal cost is linear (5 = 1)
,
which was discussed above. In this case, carrier i's marginal cost of serving
a passenger in market m reduces to
(4)
where S im = Q ik + Q ir is the sum of traffic levels on the spokes connecting the
market cities, a im = 7 ik + 7 ir , and where toim is a normal error term with mean
zero and variance aJ- (u)im and em are assumed to be uncorrelated) . 28 Note that
while the intercept in (4) depends on the characteristics of both the carrier
and the market (distance along the market spokes is important in the latter
case), the marginal cost slope is the same across carriers and markets.'
The carrier determines q im by equating marginal revenue and marginal cost,
which yields
a„ + (l/b)(qm + q im ) + e m = a im + /3S im + wim .
(5)
Summing across the n^ carriers in the market, 29 (5) becomes
28Note that the market- specific shocks to carrier marginal costs are drawn from
the same distribution. We model network-wide firm- specific shocks by
letting the marginal cost intercept depend on the identity of the carrier;
on this, see below.
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(6)
where the bars over the variables on the RHS indicate that these are mean
values over the carriers in the market (the errors are summed across these
carriers)
.
Solving (6) for qm and substituting into (1) yields the two reduced-
form equations for the market quantity and fare:
b
(1+nJ (7)
1
Pm = K + Vm + ft*A1 + um ,
1+t^, (8)
where
l+n* (9)
Siemwim + €
m =
Note that the variances of
<f>m and um are o<£ = b 2 (nm2a e 2 + nmau2 )/(l+nm ) 2 and oj- =
(a £ 2 + nmcru2 )/(l+nTn ) 2 respectively, and that the correlation between <f>m and um is
p = bn^Ccru2 - a £ 2 )/a^av (l+nm ) 2 . 30 Note also that (8) is linear in the fare, in
23Recall that MKTCOM in Section 3 counted other competitors in the market,
regardless of whether they provided nonstop or 4- segment (connecting)
service. Here, n^ is equal to the number of firms with connecting service
(nonstop competitors are ignored) . This approach involves an implicit
assumption that connecting service is a different product than nonstop
service.
30The issue of endogeneity of SPKPASS can be_clarified with reference to (7)
and (8). The first thing to note is that Sm can be determined by solving the
reduced-form equations simultaneously across all markets, keeping track of
which markets use which spokes. The solution will show that Sm depends on
23
contrast to the semi- log reduced- form specification of Section 3 (see below for
further discussion of this point). 31
If the spoke marginal cost functions are nonlinear (if 8 above differs
from unity), then the reduced-form equations must be modified. In particular,
the expression ^r^S,,, in (6) and (7) must be replaced by
(ID
where Qimo and Qimd are carrier i's traffic levels on the spokes connecting the
origin and destination cities of market m to the hub.
To estimate demand and marginal cost parameters from the above reduced-
form equations, we proceed as follows. First, we let the demand and marginal
cost intercepts be given by
a^ = a + a^NCORIG,,, + a2TEMPDIFm + a3MKTPPn
(12)
and
am ' *oi + alDIST im + a 2ORDm + a3DCATT, + a^LG^ + a 5JFKm -
(13)
where a
o1 is the carrier- specific component of the marginal cost intercept.
After substituting (12) and (13) in (7) and (8), 32 we estimate the structural
the error terms w im and c m for all airline markets in the economy. Given
that the error terms in (8) relate to a single market , correlation between Sm
and these errors will be negligible as long as errors are uncorrelated
across markets. Treating Sm as exogenous in estimating (7) and (8) is then
appropriate. This argument can also be used to justify the use of OLS in
the fare regressions of Section 3.
31The error terms for observations representing travel in different directions
in a given city-pair market might be correlated, a possibility that we
ignore. BDS found that taking such correlation into account had little
effect on their results.
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parameters by maximum likelihood, taking the cross -equation parameter
restrictions and the correlation between the equations' errors into account.
Nonlinear ordinary least squares estimates would be consistent but inefficient
(inefficiency results from ignoring the heteroscedasticity and correlation of
the errors in (9) and (10)). 33
As noted above, the model as presented appears to ignore demand
heterogeneity in the market. However, recognizing the presence of
heterogeneity may leave the basic structure unchanged. For example, suppose
that all markets have K different groups of travellers, each with a different
demand intercept a^, k=l , 2 K, in (1) (demand slopes are assumed to be the
same, but the errors e mk are now group-specific). Then, assuming airlines can
segment the market by the usual kinds of fare restrictions, they will equate
marginal revenue to marginal cost for each type of traveller, leading to K sets
of equations (7) and (8) (a,,,, <f>m , um are now indexed by k) . These equations can
be collapsed by first summing (7) across k, which yields an equation with total
market traffic (Sk qmk ) on the left-hand side, the average demand intercept
(Sk aJyiC) on the right, and with b replaced by bK. Similarly, (8) is collapsed
by averaging, which yields an equation with the average fare 2k pmk/K on the
left-hand side and Sk aJVK on the right. The new equations are thus the ones
that would result from replacing (1) by pm = 2k aJyK + (l/bK)qm and interpreting
32Note that, using (13),
<*m
" <*lDISTm +a 2ORDm + a^DCA,,, + a^LGA,, + agJFK,,, + (l/nm)SiGmaoi CARim ,
where DISTm is average distance for the carriers in market m and CARim is a
variable that assumes the value one if carrier i serves market m and zero
otherwise. Note that these latter variables are not dummies in the sense of
Section 3 since several of the variables can equal unity for a given market
observation.
33The estimation was carried out using the DFP algorithm of GQOPT. Nonlinear
OLS and maximum likelihood estimation in fact yield similar results.
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pm in (8) as average fare in the market. It is easy to see, however, that this
equation gives the inverse of the aggregate market demand curve. Our estimates
can thus be viewed as giving the slope and intercept of this aggregate curve
under conditions of demand heterogeneity.
Given this discussion, the heterogeneity of actual fares is collapsed by
taking a simple average across carriers in each market of the unweighted
carrier- specific mean fares already computed in the mean- fare data set. This
"mean market" fare plays the role of pm above. In addition, passengers on all
carriers are summed within each market and the result multiplied by 10 to get
qm .
34 The data set that results from this averaging procedure has 5431
observations
.
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b. Results
In estimating the model, we allowed the spoke marginal cost function to
take a nonlinear form, with the exponent 8 different from unity. Since the
resulting estimate of 6 was close to one, we also computed results for the
linear case. The first column of Table 4 shows the key estimated coefficients
for the nonlinear specification, while the second column shows the linear
results. The demand coefficients are nearly identical for the two
specifications. The coefficients a^
,
a2 , and a3 of the three demand- shift
variables are all significantly positive, indicating that demand for air travel
34Recall that the DBlA data is drawn from a 10% sample. The average number of
passengers per market is 170 in this "mean-market" data set, and the average
fare is $299.
35In generating this data set, we dropped the restrictions in footnote 16 (this
was done to conserve all possible information for each market). However, we
eliminated markets for which the origin was a concentrated hub airport (see
BDS for a list). As argued by Borenstein (1988, 1989), in those markets,
dominant carriers command a fare premium over fringe carriers, making
inappropriate our assumption of homogeneous products.
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is high when a market is large, has a high- income origin city, or has high
tourism potential (the demand intercept (eq. (12)) evaluated at sample means
equals* 414. 52 and 414.42 for the two cases). 36 In addition, the reciprocal of
the inverse -demand slope is negative and strongly significant. Among the
marginal cost estimates, the DIST coefficient is significant and positive in
both specifications, and spoke traffic's exponent in the nonlinear
specification is equal to 1.109. While this value is significantly different
from unity on the basis of a t-test, its closeness to one means that the linear
specification can be adopted with little loss of accuracy. 37 Since the
multiplicative /3 coefficient is significantly negative under both
specifications, marginal cost is decreasing in spoke traffic in both cases.
The estimates thus confirm the existence of economies of density at the
structural level, reinforcing the results of the fare regressions of Section 3.
The coefficients of the carrier and airport variables in the marginal cost
function are not reported, 38 but the marginal cost intercept (eq. (13))
evaluated at sample means equals 218.91 and 288.45 in the two cases. The Table
also shows the estimated standard deviations of the demand and marginal cost
shocks
.
Elasticities are reported in Table 5. In both specifications, the price
36Since INCORIG, TEMPDIF, and MKTPP are market specific, sample means of these
variables are taken from the mean-market data set. Means of the marginal
cost variables are taken from the mean- fare data set, which is carrier-
specific.
37Note that since the log likelihoods for the linear and nonlinear models
differ by less than one, the linear model cannot be rejected against the
nonlinear alternative using a likelihood ratio test (this test and the t-
test need not give the same answer in a nonlinear setting)
.
38Major carriers with marginal costs lower than American's are Braniff, America
West, Midway, New York Air, and Air Cal. Carrier-variable coefficients are
larger than the American value of 129.2, indicating higher costs, for all
the other major airlines.
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elasticity of demand evaluated at sample means is a plausible -2.5, while the
income elasticity is O.6. 39 The TEMPDIF elasticity is small, while the MKTPP
elasticity of 0.3 indicates that demand increases less rapidly than the size of
the market. The elasticity of marginal cost with respect to distance equals is
near 0.3, a number close to the distance elasticity in the earlier fare
regressions. The major result of Table 5, of course, concerns the strength of
economies of traffic density, which is revealed by the elasticity of marginal
cost with respect to SPKPASS . The elasticity value is -0.449 in the nonlinear
specification and -0.468 in the linear case, showing that marginal cost falls
by about 4.5% for every 10% increase in spoke traffic. 40 This density effect is
more than twice as strong as that estimated by Caves et al
.
, whose 0.80 cost
elasticity with respect to traffic translates into a marginal cost elasticity
of -0.20.
Using (8) from the linear specification, we can compute the extent to
which cost savings from higher traffic densities are passed on to passengers in
lower fares, addressing the question raised at the beginning of this section.
Suppose first that a single carrier in a market experiences a one -standard-
deviation increase in spoke traffic. 41 Using (8), the result is a fare decrease
of 6% (evaluated at sample means) . If, instead, each carrier in the market
experiences a one -standard- deviation increase in spoke traffic, (8) shows that
fares fall by 9%. 42 On the cost side, our estimates suggest that a one-
390ur price elasticity is of roughly the same order of magnitude as the -1.6
value used by Brander and Zhang (1990) , which represents their judgement as
to the best estimate from the prior literature.
40These values give the elasticity of marginal cost for a single spoke with
respect to traffic on that spoke.
41Recall that this increase is about 33,000 passengers per quarter.
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standard- deviation increase in spoke traffic reduces marginal cost by 24% (this
follows because traffic rises by nearly 50% and because the estimated linear
elasticity is -0.47). Therefore, evaluating at sample means, our results
suggest that somewhat less than half (9% vs. 24%) of a cost reduction resulting
from a symmetric increase in traffic across carriers is passed on to passengers
in the form of lower fares
.
The 6% fare reduction from a single-carrier increase in spoke traffic is
more than three times as large as the 1-2% decline computed in Section 3, and
it is important to isolate the reason for this discrepancy. The discrepancy is
not due to the different functional forms of the regressions (semi -log in
Section 3 vs. linear here) nor to the use of cross -equation restrictions in
estimating the fare equation (8). 43 Aggregation up to the market level is also
not the source of the discrepancy (recall that the earlier observations were
carrier- rather than market-specific). 44 The discrepancy is thus a consequence
of the one remaining difference between the specifications: the nonlinear form
of the structural price equation, in which average spoke traffic appears
multiplied by the term ^/(l+n,,,) . This functional form, however, is implied by
the Cournot model. If that model is correct, then we could conclude that the
smaller fare impacts from the earlier ad-hoc regressions are the result of
specification error. In any case, it is clear that the quantitative impact of
42The average number of carriers per market is 1.46.
43Linear versions of the regressions of Section 3 yield the same 1-2% fare
impacts from a one-standard-deviation increase in spoke traffic. Also, when
(8) is estimated independently by OLS , ignoring the cross-equation
restrictions, the results still yield a large 5.3% fare impact.
44 If, using the mean-market data set, average market fare is regressed on the
average spoke traffic of carriers in the market (in an equation analogous to
those in Table 2), the implied fare reduction from a one -standard- deviation
traffic increase is 1.1%, which lies in the earlier range.
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spoke traffic on fares will be sensitive to the specification of the estimating
equation.
In the next section of the paper, we use the structural estimates to
simulate the impact of an airline merger.
5. Merger Simulations
The TWA-Ozark and Northwest-Republic mergers, which created monopoly hub
airports at St. Louis and Minneapolis respectively, have generated much concern
among policy makers. The concern has centered on monopolistic exploitation of
passengers originating or terminating at the hub airports, who now have little
choice among carriers and are thus likely to pay higher fares. There has been
partial confirmation of this prediction in several studies [see Borenstein
(1990), U.S. General Accounting Office (1988), Department of Transportation
(1989), and Werden, Joskow, and Johnson (1989)]. Elsewhere, however, we have
pointed out that connecting passengers, who are not subject to monopoly power
given a choice of hubs, may actually benefit from the merger (see BDS) . The
reason is that the merger creates a larger, more densely- travelled network, and
this effect, together with continued competition in the 4- segment markets, may
lead to lower fares for connecting passengers.
a. The setup
Using the structural estimates from the linear specification, we can
simulate the effects of a TWA-Ozark- type merger to evaluate these predictions. 45
We consider several scenarios where three or more competing carriers serve a
common set of J cities out of several hubs, as shown in Figure 2. In case I,
two carriers (#1 and #2) operate out of hub A, while another carrier (#3)
serves the same endpoints out of hub B (the Figure uses J = 3) . Residents of
45For an earlier study of the effects of mergers, see Carlton, Landes and
Posner (1980).
30
each endpoint have travel demands to every other endpoint and to each of the
hub cities, and residents of the hub cities demand travel to each of the
endpoints (for simplicity, there is no demand for travel between the hubs)
.
Using the demand and marginal cost functions from the linear case of Section 4,
we simulate the effect of a merger of the two hub-A carriers.
Case II differs from Case I in that hub B supports two carriers instead
of one (#4 is added). In Case III, the two non-merging carriers operate out of
different hubs, B and C (there are now travel demands from each endpoint to
each of the three hubs) . The impact of a merger of the hub -A carriers is again
simulated. The common element in each case is that the merger partners gain
monopoly power over traffic originating or terminating at hub A. Competition
is reduced by the merger, but not eliminated, in the 4-segment (connecting)
city-pair markets. 46
Before providing a detailed explanation of the simulations, several
caveats are in order. The first relates to our assumption that the merging
airlines compete in all markets served via hub A. This assumption, which is
made to preserve the model's symmetry (and its computational simplicity), means
that the loss of competition in the 4-segment markets is greater than that
experienced in actual mergers. For example, TWA and Ozark competed in only 10%
of the 4-segment markets served through St. Louis, while Northwest and Republic
competed in 18% of the 4-segment markets served through Minneapolis. Given
this difference, our results may substantially overstate the anticompetitive
effects of a merger. In addition, our cost estimates do not include the fixed
costs of network operations. If redundant fixed costs are eliminated by the
merger, the result is a welfare gain that is not captured by our calculations.
46See Brueckner and Spiller (1991) for an analysis of the effect of localized
competition within a network (and the effect of mergers that eliminate such
competition) using a model similar to the one presented here.
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On both these counts, our simulations may understate any welfare gains
associated with a TWA- Ozark -type merger.
In the simulations, we assume that each carrier is identical by
evaluating the marginal cost intercept aim at the sample mean values of the
carrier dummy variables (the slot-control dummies are set to zero) . In
addition, all connecting trips are assumed to be the same length, equal to the
sample mean value of DIST. 47 Using the resulting common value of a, the spoke
marginal cost function is then (a/2) + /3Q for each carrier, where Q represents
traffic on a single spoke.
To generate demand, we assume that the demand function estimated in
Section 4 applies to direct as well as connecting flights. We evaluate the
demand intercept a,,, for each market using sample average values of INCORIG and
TEMPDIF. For connecting markets, we set MKTPP equal to the sample mean value,
while for hub markets, MKTPP is adjusted to reflect the typically larger
population of the hub. 48 The common value of a,,, for the connecting markets is
denoted a, while the common value for the hub markets is aH .
Consider now the optimization problems faced by the carriers under case
I. Let q i denote carrier i's traffic (i = 1,2,3) in each of its J(J-l)
connecting markets (note that markets are treated as directional for
consistency with the empirical work). Carrier i's total revenue from the
connecting markets is then J(J-l)q
i
[a+k(q
1+q 2+q3 ) ] , where k 1/b is the demand
slope from (1) . Note that a + k(q^+q 2+q3) gives the fare in a connecting
market, each of which is served by all three carriers. Similarly, let q Hi
47This is literally impossible given the different locations of the hubs, but
seems to be a safe approximation.
48In this case, MKTPP is set equal to the sample average of [ (POP^P^) 1 / 2 +
(POPjPOPhub ) 1 / 2 ]/2 , which approximates the population potential of a typical
hub market (i and j denote the endpoints of 4-segment markets)
.
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denote carrier i's traffic (i - 1,2) in each of its 2J hub markets (these are
markets where one endpoint is hub A). Carrier i's total revenue from the hub
markets is then 2JqHi [aH+k(qH1+q H2 ) ] , i = 1,2. Note that aH + k(q H1+q H2 ) is the
fare in a hub -A market, each of which is served by carriers 1 and 2. Finally,
since total traffic on each spoke consists of traffic in 2(J-1) connecting
markets and 2 hub markets, carrier i's cost (i- 1,2,3) of operating each of its
J spokes is c(2(J-l)q
i
+2qHi ) . Profit for carriers 1 or 2 is then
J(J-l) qi [a+k( qi+q 2+q3)] + 2JqHi [aH+k(qH1+qH2 ) ] - Jc(2 (J-l) qi +2q Hi ) ,
(14)
for i - 1,2 (fixed cost is ignored). Carrier 3 differs from 1 and 2 in that it
alone serves the hub-B markets. The fare in these markets is aH + kq H3 and
total revenue is 2JqH3 (aH+kqH3 ) . Carrier 3's profit can then be written
J(J-l)q3 [a+k( qi+q 2+q3 )] + 2Jq H3 (aH+kqH3 ) - Jc(2(J-l)q3+2qH3 ) .
(15)
To find the premerger equilibrium, first-order conditions are derived for q i and
qHi , i—1,2,3, and the conditions are solved algebraically (c' is represented by
the above spoke marginal cost function). To find the postmerger equilibrium,
the first-order conditions are solved again under the assumption q2 = q H2 = 0.
The equilibria are then compared. The profit functions for cases II and III
are easy extensions of (14) and (15)
.
b. Simulation results
Table 6 presents the simulation results for the three merger scenarios
under the assumption that the number of endpoints served is 80. Consider Case
I first. The numbers of carriers operating through the hubs are listed under
#A, #B, and #C
; q i denotes carrier i's traffic in each connecting market, qHi
denotes the carrier's hub -market traffic; Q i denotes the carrier's spoke traffic
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*
(this is traffic on an individual spoke) ; q denotes total traffic in the
connecting markets (2^); p is the fare in each connecting market; and p H12 and
p H3 are the fares in the hub markets for carriers 1 and 2 and carrier 3
respectively (q 2 , q^ i an^ Q 2 are all zero in the second line). 49 The results
for Case I show that the merger leads to a slight fare increase in the
connecting markets, and that it raises the fare to hub A substantially while
slightly reducing the fare to hub B. Total quantities in each type of market
show opposite movements. On balance, consumer surplus falls as a result of
these market impacts while total profit for all carriers rises. 50 Since the
profit increase is slightly larger than the reduction in surplus, net benefit
rises slightly as a result of the merger. 51
The key to these results is that the merger has differential effects on
competition in the hub and connecting markets. Passengers originating or
terminating at hub A now face a monopoly carrier, while connecting passengers
still enjoy the benefits of competition (the number of competitors, however, is
reduced from 3 to 2 in the connecting markets) . The merger also leads to
higher spoke traffic levels, and the resulting reduction in marginal cost
interacts with the changes in competition to determine fare impacts. For hub-A
passengers, the total elimination of competition overwhelms the effect of lower
49Variables for carrier 4 appear in Cases II and III, but these are self-
explanatory.
50The profit of carrier #3 rises substantially, while the merged carrier earns
profit somewhat higher than the combined premerger profits of carriers #1
and #2.
51 It is worth noting that the second-order condition for the carriers'
maximization problems, which requires -£ < -k/(2J-l) , is satisfied under our
parameter values (this condition says that economies of density must be
bounded by a quantity that depends on the demand slope and the number of
endpoints served)
.
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costs, and fares rise substantially. This is the impact emphasized by merger
critics. However, for connecting passengers, the effects of the cost reduction
and the loss of competition nearly offset one another, leading to a slight
increase in fares. 52 This outcome is qualitatively different from the one
predicted by BDS , but given the potential bias in our simulations and given
that BDS predicted only a 1 - 2% decline in connecting fares, the effects may
be indistinguishable. 53 On balance, then, a TWA- Ozark- type merger appears to
benefit the airlines while reducing consumer welfare, with the big losers being
the passengers travelling to or from the monopoly hub.
In Cases II and III, the merging carriers face additional competition,
either through hub B or a third hub. The outcomes in these cases, however, are
qualitatively similar to case I. Connecting fares rise slightly, hub-A fares
rise substantially, hub-B (and hub-C fares in case III) fall slightly, surplus
falls, profit rises, and net benefit increases slightly. This shows that even
when more initial competitors are added to the connecting markets , the effect
of lost competition is still strong enough to offset the merger's cost
reduction, leading to slightly higher connecting fares. This conclusion holds
independently of whether the additional carrier operates from hub B or from hub
C.
Although the merger scenarios are complicated by the existence of
multiple markets, the principle underlying the outcomes is familiar from
standard oligopoly models: With increasing returns, a merger reduces costs
52Fares to hub B fall because the rise in carrier 3's spoke traffic as a result
of the loss of a competitor in the connecting markets lowers marginal cost
while the extent of competition in the hub-B markets (i.e., none) remains
unchanged.
53Borenstein (1992) provides estimates of the impact of the Northwest-Republic
merger on connecting fares at Minneapolis, and his results also fall in the
1-2% range.
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while eliminating competition. The merger will be welfare -improving if the
first effect dominates the latter, an outcome that requires increasing returns
to be "strong." Our simulations reflect this principle, and the slight welfare
gains that we find testify to the strength of our estimated economies of
density.
A final point should be made regarding the realism of the simulations.
The magnitudes of fares, market traffic levels, and spoke traffic levels are
all similar to actual levels in the data. 54 While this may not be surprising
given that the simulations are based on estimated coefficients, it should be
remembered that the simulated values come from algebraic solution of a
symmetric Cournot model. Thus, the fact that the numbers are realistic is
encouraging both with respect to the accuracy of the estimates and the realism
of our modelling of airline competition.
6. Conclusion
This paper has provided the first evidence linking marginal costs and
fares to traffic densities on the spokes of an airline network. Our results
confirm the existence of the economies of density first identified by Caves et
al. (1984) while showing that the gains from density are partly passed on to
passengers in lower fares. This finding highlights a potential source of the
benefits of deregulation. By allowing the airlines to reorganize their route
54Recall that the average connecting fare is close to $300 and that average
traffic in the connecting markets is 170. The simulated spoke traffic
levels should be compared to the AVGSPKPAS values in Table A-l in the
appendix, not to the much higher sample average values (see footnote 21).
It should be noted that since the simulated networks have a U value of 1.0,
the number of city-pair markets served is vastly larger than any in Table A-
1 (over 6000). Real networks, however, serve many large markets, which
generate much more traffic than any in the simulation, while connections are
not observed (or occur at low levels) in many small markets. Therefore, the
excessive number of connections made in the simulated network may not lead
to an overstatement of total traffic flows.
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structures to increase traffic densities, deregulation led to lower costs, and
this effect (together with freer competition) may have helped to reduce fares.
The paper uses a structural approach to estimate the strength of
economies of density. Our results reveal a density effect stronger than that
identified by Caves et al . (1984). Using this estimate, along with estimates
of the parameters of demand, the paper then simulates the effect of airline
mergers and finds that the gain from higher traffic density seems to outweigh
the loss from reduced competition, leading to a slight increase in social
welfare. This welfare gain, however, is accompanied by sizable reduction in
consumer surplus
.
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Appendix
a. Network characteristics
Information about the structure of hub -and- spoke networks in the fourth
quarter of 1985 is given in Table A-l, which repeats information from BDS
.
55
The first column presents a measure of network size, denoted NTWCITP4, which
equals the total number of 4- segment city-pair markets served by each network.
The Table shows that network sizes, as represented by NTWCITP4, vary
considerably, with American's Dallas -Ft. Worth network (which serves 1564 4-
segment city-pair markets) being the largest. Each city-pair market counted in
NTWCITP4 represents a connection, via the hub, between two of the endpoints
served by the network. The number of such endpoints, denoted POINTS, is shown
in column two of Table A-l. A measure of the network's success in connecting
these endpoints is one index of its performance, and such a measure (the
network "utilization rate," denoted U) is shown in column three. U equals
NTWCITP4 (actual connections) divided by P0INTS*(P0INTS-l)/2 (potential
connections), and its value is highest for America West's Phoenix network
(.606) and lowest for United's Chicago-O'Hare network (.155). Competition
within a network is measured by NTWC0M4 , which equals the fraction of the
network's 4- segment markets in which the carrier faces at least one competitor
(competition could come from 4-segment or nonstop service). Eastern's Kansas
City network has competition in all of its 4-segment markets, while United
faces a competitor in just 40% of the markets served by its San Francisco
network. Network average population potential (NTWAVGPP) is a measure of the
average size of the markets served by a network. 56 Eastern's Kansas City
55The first five columns of the Table come from manipulation of the DBlA route
information; the last column is based on the Service Segment Databank DB27R.
56Recall that population potential for city-pair market ij is equal to
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network serves the largest markets on average, while Frontier's Denver network
serves the smallest markets. Finally, the last column of Table A-l presents
data for AVGSPKPAS , which equals the average quarterly traffic level on
individual spokes emanating from the hub of each network. 57 Delta's Atlanta
network has the highest AVGSPKPAS value (36,111 passengers per quarter), while
Ozark's St. Louis network has the lowest (12,730 passengers per quarter). Our
main hypothesis suggests that a network (like Delta's) with high spoke traffic
densities should have low costs per passenger, and thus low fares for typical
trips within it.
b. The determinants of SPKPASS
BDS test for the presence of economies of density using an indirect
approach where network characteristics appear in the reduced- form fare
regression in place of spoke traffic levels. They hypothesize that if a
network is large (if NTWCITP4 is large), then traffic levels on its spokes will
be high and fares in any given 4 -segment market will be low, other things equal
(traffic levels are high because a large network offers many destinations)
.
Similarly, if the network experiences competition in many of its markets (if
NTWC0M4 is high) , then the resulting traffic leakage will raise cost per
passenger on a typical spoke. Holding competition in a given market constant,
these higher costs then lead to higher fares in the market. BDS also discuss
the relevance of two other variables: ORIGSHR, which equals the fraction of the
network's 4- segment city pairs that include the market's origin city, and
(POPiPOPj) 1 / 2 , where POP is city population measured in 10,000s. This
quantity is summed across all city pairs served by the network and divided
by NTWCITP4 to arrive at network average population potential, NTWAVGPP.
57AVGSPKPAS is computed by deleting spokes that had fewer than 250 passengers
in the quarter (these are evidently not true spokes but instead represent
sporadic service or aircraft diversions)
.
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DESTSHR, which equals the fraction of the network's 4-segment city pairs that
include the market's destination city. Holding NTWCITP4 fixed, a high value of
ORIGSHR (DESTSHR) means that the spoke between the origin (destination) and the
hub is heavily travelled, resulting in a lower cost per passenger on that spoke
and lower fares in the market. 58 In BDS ' s regression, all of the above network
variables have the anticipated effect on fares, providing indirect evidence of
the existence of economies of density.
As explained in the text, BDS offer no evidence on the connection between
spoke traffic and network characteristics, so that key assumptions in their
argument remain untested. To verify these assumptions, Table A-2 presents the
results of a regression of SPKPASS on the above network characteristics as well
as market demand variables and carrier dummies. The Table shows that spoke
traffic in a given city-pair market is indeed an increasing function of network
size and the extent of connections between the origin and destination cities of
the market and the rest of the network (the coefficients of NTWCITP4, ORIGSHR,
and DESTSHR are significantly positive). Using our previous example, these
findings indicate that traffic on the CMI-ORD and CLE-ORD spokes of United'
s
O'Hare network will be higher than the traffic levels on spokes connecting
similar endpoint cities to the hub of a smaller network. In addition, holding
network size fixed, the traffic level on the spoke to some endpoint ZZZ
otherwise similar to CMI will be lower than on the CMI-ORD spoke if ZZZ is
included in fewer network city pairs than is CMI (the value of SPKPASS will
thus be lower for a market like ZZZ-CLE than for CMI-CLE).
Table A-2 also shows that a high degree of 4-segment competition in the
markets served by the network (a high NTWC0M4) means lower spoke traffic in any
given market. Thus, traffic on the CMI-ORD and CLE-ORD spokes of United's
network will be higher than traffic on the spokes connecting CMI and CLE to the
58Mean values of these variables are around 0.05.
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hub of a similar- sized network that experiences more generalized competition
(American's ORD network, for example; see Table A-l). Table A-2 also shows
that SPKPASS is decreasing in distance and increasing in MKTPP, INCORIG, and
INCDEST (the latter variable is per capita income for the city-pair market's
destination city). Thus, when the endpoint cities of a market are large and
have high incomes, traffic on the spokes connecting them is high.
The carrier dummies in Table A-2 tell an interesting story. They
indicate that holding network characteristics fixed, the carriers achieve
varying decrease of success relative to American, the default carrier, in
generating traffic within their networks. Nearly all carriers do a worse job
of traffic generation than American, with the only exceptions being
Continental, America West, and United. These differences could be due to the
effects of frequent flier programs, which build carrier loyalty and hence
traffic, to the carrier's skill in choosing which cities to serve out of its
hub, and to the effect of pricing policies (low fares help build network
traffic)
.
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Table 1
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
SFKFASS: The sum of the spoke traffic levels on the spokes connecting the origin and destination to the hub
DIST: One-way flight distance for the market
ORD, LGA.
JFK, DCA: Dummy variables taking the value one if origin or destination is one of the given airports
MKTPP: The market's population potential (the square root of the product of the market city populations)
INCORIG: Per capita income for the origin city
TEMPDIF: The mean January temperature at the destination minus the mean temperature at the origin
MKTCOM: The number of carriers competing with the given carrier in the market
MKTPCOM: The number of carriers serving both endpoints of the market without serving the market itself
FARE: The dollar round-trip fare
Appendix variables:
NTWCITP4
:
The number of 4-segment city-pair markets connected by the network
POINTS: The number of non-hub cities served by the network
U: The network's utilization rate, equal to NTWCITP4 divided by POINTS* ( POINTS- l)/2
NTWC0M4: The fraction of the network's 4-segment city-pair markets where at least one competitor is present
NTWAVGPP: The average population potential of the network's 4-segment city-pair markets
AVGSPKPS: Average traffic on individual spokes of various airline networks
ORIGSHR: The fraction of the network's 4-segment city-pair markets that include the origin city
DESTSHR: The fraction of the network's 4-segment markets that include the destination city
Table 2
REDUCED-FORM REGRESSION RESULTS
(Dependent variable is log FARE; t- statistics in parenthesis)
Variable /Sample Individual- fare Mean-fare Mean-fare
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INTERCEPT 2.772
(42.81)
3.896
(53.72)
3.785
(52.90)
SFKPASS -0.000000275 -0.000000367 -0.000000586
(2.35) (2. 46) (3.97)
LDIST
MKTPP
INCORIG
TEMPDIF
MKTCOM1
MKTCOM23
MKTCOM4+
MKTPCOM
0.306 0.264 0.283
(39.60) (28.81) (31.58)
-0.0000512 0.0000428 -0.000906
(1.61) (1.09) (2.32)
0.00000290 0.00000451 0.00000215
(1.08) (1.40) (0.67)
-0.00106 -0.00109 -0.00112
(7.78) (6.46) (6.60)
-0.0792 -0.0713 -0.0795
(8.18) (6.38) (7.12)
-0.0502 -0.0593 -0.0663
(10.55) (10.21) (11.48)
-0.00420 -0.00415 -0.00230
(2.87) (2.19) (1.22)
-0.0184 -0.0195 **
(9.52) (8.19)
,2486 .2642 .2577
obs»13,308 for individual-fare sample; obs=7732 for mean-fare sample
Table 3
AIRPORT AND CARRIER DUMMY COEFFICIENTS
(Estimates are for the regression in column (2) of Table 2;
t- statistics in parentheses)
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ORD 0.0446 MIDWAY -0.126
(2.27) (3.60)
LGA -0.0312 NORTHWEST -0.00603
(1.46) (0.20)
JFK -0.0906 NEW YORK AIR -0.216
(1.53) (3.64)
DCA 0.0558 AIR CAL -0.522
(2.84) (4.40)
US AIR 0.0285 OZARK -0.00810
(1.62) (0.28)
ASPEN -0.196 PIEDMONT -0.135
(3.28) (7.58)
CONTINENTAL -0.0230 REPUBLIC 0.0830
(1.30) (4.68)
DELTA 0.240 TRANS WORLD 0.0204
(16.26) (1.17)
EASTERN 0.0600 UNITED 0.122
(3.71) (7.74)
FRONTIER -0.0730 EMPIRE -0.181
(3.05) (2.75)
AMERICA WEST -0.224 FLORIDA EXPRESS -0.234
(8.84) (5.04)
BRANIFF 0.0704 AIR WISCONSIN 0.0676
(0.85) (0.60)
PAN AM -0.0000266 WESTERN 0.0712
(0.00) (3.34)
Table 4
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD STRUCTURAL ESTIMATES
(mean-market sample (obs=5A31); asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
DEMAND COEFFICIENTS
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a_ (intercept)
ai (INCORIG)
a2 (TEMPDIF)
a, (MKTPP)
b (slope)
Nonlinear MC Linear MC
299.8 300.8
(66.21) (109.16)
0.00732 0.00721
(13.69) (15.40)
0.971 0.967
(8.66) (8.28)
0.290 0.290
(14.29) (13.69)
-1.482 -1.483
(75.26) (71.60)
174.3 174.2
(78.52) (76.02)
MARGINAL COST COEFFICIENTS
an i (Americanrol
intercept)
aj (DIST)
P (spoke traffic
multiplicative)
S (spoke traffic exponent)
*u
Nonlinear MC Linear MC
127.8 129.2
(18.19) (16.89)
0.0506 0.0500
(18.14) (16.18)
-0.000388 -0.00137
(2.73) (16.58)
1.109 1.0
(36.46) •
144.8 144.8
(105.71) (92.11)
log likelihood •56157 -56158
(coefficients of the slot-control and carrier variables are not reported)
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Table 5
STRUCTURAL ELASTICITIES
(evaluated at sample means)
DEMAND
Nonlinear MC Linear MC
Price: -2.495 -2.497
INCORIG: 0.616 0.608
TEMPDIF: 0.015 0.015
MKTPP: 0.336 0.336
MARGINAL COST
Nonlinear MC Linear MC
DIST: 0.310 0.311
spoke traffic -0.449 -0.468
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Table 6
MERGER SIMULATIONS
CASE I
#A #B #C qi,q2 qHl.qH2 Ql.Q2 <I3 qH3 Q3 q P PH12 PH3 Net benefit* Profit Surplus
2 10 55 149 9022 57 223 9441 167 $302 S232 $282 $103.26 tn $36.11 m $67.15 m
1 1 80 227 13039 80 227 13039 160 $307 $280 $280 $106.15 tn $46.52 m $59.63 m
CASE II
#A #B #C qi,q2 qHl.qH2 Ql.Q2 ^.^ qH3.qH4 Q3.Q4 q P PH12 PH34 Net bft. Profit Surplus
2 2 43 147 7078 43 147 7078 172 $299 $234 $234 $101.99 m $29.78 m $72.21 m
12 57 223 9441 55 149 9022 167 $302 $282 $232 $103.26 m $36.11 m $67.15 tn
CASE III
#A #B #C qi,q2 qHl.qH2 Ql.Q2 ^.^ qH3.qH4 Q3.Q4 q P PH12 PH34 Net bft. Profit Surplus
2 1 1 42 147 6956 44 221 7371 172 $298 $234 $284 $108.49 in $35.49 tn $73.00 tn
111 56 223 9280 56 223 9280 168 $301 $282 $282 $109.90 m $41.89 m $68.01 tn
*Net benefit, Profit, and Surplus are in millions of dollars.
(Numbers may not add due to rounding; qo quo * Q7 = in the second row of each case)
Table A~l
NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS (4th QUARTER 1985)
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Hub/Carrier
Atlanta/Delta
NTWCITP4 POINTS U NTWCOM4 NTWAVGPP AVGSPKPS
1368 86 .374 .701 113,1 36,111
Atlanta /Eastern 1306 91 .319 .779 131.5 28,030
Baltimore-Wash. /Piedmont 214 47 198 .692 130.2 12,450
Charlotte /Piedmont 716 59 418 .588 127.4 22,418
Dayton /Piedmont 158 33 .299 .665 135.4 13,453
Denver /Continental 307 44 325 .932 204.4 26,171
Denver /Frontier 498 50 .407 .673 75.2 15,463
Denver/United 635 82 191 .800 140.6 18,762
Dallas-Ft. Worth/American 1564 101 .310 .650 134.7 34,740
Dallas-Ft. Worth/Delta 402 55 .271 948 152.4 25,434
Detroit /Republic 528 61 .289 .642 156.2 18,350
Houston /Continental 325 44 .344 .794 170.2 25,945
Kansas City/Eastern 125 39 169 1.000 291.1 14,627
Chicago (Midway) /Midway 64 19 .374 .984 252.7 16,056
Memphis /Republic 668 57 ,419 .704 134.2 16,987
Minneapolis /Northwest 242 42 .281 .740 183.4 18,340
Minneapolis /Republic 480 59 .281 .429 81.7 15,021
Chicago (0'Hare)/American 758 78 .252 .815 174.1 25,876
Chicago (0'Hare)/United 1033 116 .155 .754 151.4 26,601
Philadelphia/US Air 144 42 167 .507 113.0 18,305
Phoenix/America West 140 22 .606 .700 86.7 33,622
Pittsburgh/US Air 1243 81 .384 .526 135.2 23,662
San Francisco/United 133 37 .200 .398 97.7 29,660
Salt Lake City/Western 537 52 .405 .611 115.6 15,611
St. Louis /Ozark 445 54 .311 .544 111.4 12,730
St. Louis /TWA 756 63 .387 .952 196.0 24,911
Table A-2
THE DETERMINANTS OF SPKPASS
(Dependent variable is SPKPASS; mean-fare sample (obs=7732);
t-statistics in parentheses)
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INTERCEPT 68700
(10.96)
NTWCITP4 48.9
(38.01)
ORIGSHR 110720
(11.97)
DESTSHR 136027
(14.16)
NC4COM -23513
(7.01)
LDIST -10079
(16.47)
MKTPP 80.8
(38.26)
INCORIG 1.62
(7.14)
INCDEST 1.21
(5.66)
TEMPDIF 6.47
(0.54)
US AIR -42362
(32.46)
ASPEN -76927
(14.78)
CONTINENTAL 11909
(7.67)
DELTA -2427
(2.29)
EASTERN -17354
(14.99)
FRONTIER -13745
(7.31)
AMERICA WEST 32677
(15.29)
BRANIFF -55956
(9.06)
PAN AM -23522
(2.87)
MIDWAY -25429
(9.55)
NORTHWEST -5502
(2.36)
NEW YORK AIR -26327
(8.37)
AIR CAL -55922
(6.45)
OZARK -22095
(9.42)
PIEDMONT -18242
(11.90)
REPUBLIC -22904
(15.10)
TRANS WORLD -146
(0,10)
UNITED 4547
(3.63)
EMPIRE -61975
(12.51)
WESTERN -16615
(9.67)
FLORIDA EXP. -53690
(14.99)
AIR WISC. -59057
(7.12)
.5571
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